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EXECUTIONS AND LEVIES ON TANGIBLE
PROPERTY*
GRAHAM SUSMAN
of the Denver Bar

The subject of "Judgment and Executions" covers nearly an
entire volume in Corpus Juris, so that it is apparent that only the
highlights of the Colorado law on this subject can be covered in
an article of this length. The statutory law may be found in Chapter 93 of the Colorado Statutes Annotated (1935), and reference
hereinafter made to specific sections are intended to refer to that.
chapter.
Section 2 provides that a transcript of judgment may be recorded in any county, and from the time of filing becomes a lien on
the real property of such judgment debtor located in that county,
not exempt from execution, then owned or which may thereafter
be acquired, until the lien expires. The general lien created by the
recording of the transcript is good for a period of six years from
the entry of the judgment as distinguished from the date of recording. A. transcript may be issued and recorded immediately
after the judgment is entered, even before the filing of a motion for
new trial. There is no necessity to wait for ten days, as in the case
of an execution, and for that reason it is advisable to obtain the
transcript and to record it as quickly as possible after the judgment is entered. There is no limit as to the number of transcripts
that may be issued on the same judgment.
An execution may be issued on a judgment of record at any
time within twenty years (within six years in the justice court),
and not afterwards, unless the judgment is revived as provided by
law. Section 11 provides' that the execution may be issued to any
county, so that it is possible to obtain an execution for each county
in the state at the same time, but only one execution will be issued
for any one county at any one time. If it is necessary to obtain another execution to the same county, the previous outstanding execution must be returned, together with the sheriff's return thereon.
Section 12 provides that when an execution has been issued,
it shall be delivered to the sheriff, who must then endorse thereon
the exact date, year and hour that it is received. This information
is also entered in a book which he maintains for that purpose, and
this record is open to the public. The effect of this entry by the
sheriff is to make the execution a lien upon the personal property
of the debtor from the date of such entry.' The sheriff must then
make his return on the execution within. 90 days "unless a sale is
pending under a levy made."
* This article highlights the third part of the Denver Bar Association's institute on
creditors' rights and was presented by Mr. Susman at the meeting on January 31, 1950.
I Joslin v. Spangler, 13 Colo. 491. 22 P. 804 (1889).
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LEVIES ON REAL ESTATE

Section 40 provides that when an execution is issued from any
district or county court, and a levy is made upon real estate, it is
the duty of the sheriff to file a certificate of such fact with the recorder of the county where such real estate is situated. From and
after filing the same, such levy takes effect as to creditors and bona
fide purchasers without notice, and not before. The lien created by
the recording of the levy is a specific lien upon the-property therein
described for a period of six years from the date of filing of the
certificate. The attorney should make certain that the correct legal
description of the property is contained in the certificate. It might
be well here to point out that the general lien of the transcript is
good for six years from the date of the judgment, but the specific
lien of the levy is good for six years from the date of the filing of
the certificate. This distinction should be kept in mind.
In order to prodeed with the sheriff's sale, it is necessary that
the sheriff then serve a "Notice of Levy" upon the judgment debtor,
as required by Section 31. This notice must be served in the same
manner as service of summons. If the debtor is not available for
service, then the notice must be published in the county for ten days,
and the clerk must mail a copy of the notice of levy to his last
known address, postage prepaid, and make and file an affidavit of
such mailing.
Within ten days after the service of the notice of levy, the
defendant may file his written claim for exemption with the clerk
of the court setting forth a description of the property levied upon
and the grounds of such claim of exemption. 2 If the defendant fails
to file his written claim for exemption within the ten days after
date of service, he waives his claim for exemption, and thereafter
he has no claim for damages against the officer making the levy or
against the plaintiff for levying on such exempt property. This
applies to personal property as well as real estate. On the other
hand, if the defendant files a written claim of exemption within the
ten days, then all further proceedings in connection with the levy,
sale, etc., are stayed until the matter of the claim of exemption can
be heard.
The court must immediately set the claim of exemption for
hearing at a time not less than five nor more than fifteen days from
the date of filing. If the district judge is not available to hear the
claim of exemption, or if he is disqualified or otherwise unable to
act, the county judge shall hear and determine the claim, and his
findings shall have the same force and effect as those of a district
court judge. If the court finds the property to be exempt, it will
enter an order to release the property, otherwise it will enter an
order that the property be sold. The order on the question of
whether or not the property is exempt, having been entered by the

2

For general exemption, see COLO. STAT. ANN., c. 93, §§ 13 to 22 (1935).
stead exemptions, see COLO. STAT. ANN., C. 93, § 23.to 29 (1935).

For home-
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court, it is a final judgment for the purpose of appeal or writ of
error.
Assuming the property is held to be not exempt, the sheriff
must then advertise the sale for at least twenty days in some daily
or weekly newspaper in the county. If there is no newspaper in
the county, then notice is given by a posting in "three of the most
public places" in the county. The notice must contain a description
of the property to be sold and a designation of the time and place
of sale. The sale must be a public rather than a private sale, and
it is usually held at the front entrance of the court house. It must
be held between the hours of 9:00 o'clock in the morning "and the
setting of the sun, the same day." There seems to be no statutory
requirement providing for notice of sale to be given to the defendant other than the advertising for the twenty day period. However, many attorneys usually send a copy of the advertisement to
the defendant by registered mail.
If the sheriff sells the property without advertising it, or otherwise giving notice as required by statute, "the sheriff or other officer so offending shall, for every offense, forfeit and pay the sum
of $50.00, to be recovered, with costs of suit, in any court of record
in this state by the person whose lands may be advertised and
sold." 3
As soon as the sale is completed, the sheriff then issues a certificate of purchase which contains a description of the property,
the price bid, and the time within which the purchaser is entitled
to a deed. He must also record a duplicate copy of such certificate
with the recorder within ten days from the date of sale.
THE REDEMPTION FROM SALE OF THE PROPERTY

From this point, the procedure concerning redemption by the
defendant or subsequent lienors is practically the same as redemption from sale under a trust deed by the public trustee. Upon the
expiration of the period of redemption, if the property has not been
redeemed, the sheriff must execute and deliver a deed to the then
holder of the certificate of purchase. Such deed vests a title free
and clear of all liens recorded subsequent to the recording of the
lien on which the sale was based. This deed should then be recorded.
Questions have sometimes arisen regarding the payment of
taxes, interest on prior encumbrances, water, insurance, etc. during the period of redemption. By Section 53 the holder of the certificate of purchase may pay any general or special taxes, water
assessments, premiums on insurance covering the property, or interest or principal due on a prior encumbrance, and upon presentation to the sheriff of receipts for such payments, they become an
additional claim in favor of the holder of the certificate of purchase. Before the redemption can be made, the debtor must pay
I See

COLO. STAT. ANN.,

C.

93, § 47 (1935).
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these additional amounts, together with lawful interest, in order to
obtain a certificate of redemption.
Quite often an attorney will cause a levy to be made, have the
defendant served with a notice of levy, and thereafter hold up the
actual sale for one reason or another, usually to give the defendant
an opportunity to make payment of the judgment. In the meantime, the creditor has a specific lien on the real estate, which is
good for six years from the date of levy, and he is not particularly
worried about the defendant disposing of the property. If he permits the ninety days under the execution to lapse before deciding
to proceed with the sale, he cannot do so under the execution on
which the levy was based because such execution has expired. It
would serve no useful purpose to obtain a new execution because
the levy was made under a previous one. The proper procedure,
under such circumstances, is for the creditor to file a petition
in court setting forth the facts of the execution, the levy, a description of the property levied upon, and the fact that the execution
upon which the levy was made has now expired, and request the
court for an order to sell. The court will then issue an order directed to the sheriff to proceed with the sale, and it then continues
in the same manner as though the execution had not expired. This
is the same procedure as the old common law writ of venditioni
exponas.4
LEVIES ON PERSONAL PROPERTY
Much of the material contained in the foregoing discussion
relative to the sale of real estate is equally applicable to the sale of
personal property. It has already been pointed out that the entry
of the execution in the sheriff's book constitutes a lien on the personal property of the debtor, although there cannot be a sale of
such property until there has been an actual seizure and it is in the
possession of the sheriff. The procedure for service of notice of
levy is exactly the same whether it be real or personal property.
The sale of personal property must be advertised by the sheriff
for a period of ten days, instead of twenty days as in the case of
real estate, and the public sale then proceeds in the same manner.
The only difference is the fact that there is no redemption period
when personal property is sold. The buyer obtains a sheriff's bill
of sale, and upon payment of the bid, the personal property is delivered to the buyer.
Generally speaking, any specie of personal property described
as a chattel is subject to execution, provided that it is not exempt
by statute, and provided that it is in being at the time of the levy
and sale. 5 Under Section 8, the sheriff may levy upon "all current
gold and silver coins, bank bills and other evidences of debt, used
'66 C. J. 430.
'28 C. J. 325.
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or circulated ... as money." Under this statute, the sheriff may
levy upon the money in a cash register or strong box.
In the event that the value of the property seized is greater
than the statutory exemption, the court may order the property
sold, and out of the first proceeds of such sale, order that the defendant shall be paid the amount of his exemption. For example,
tools in trade are exempt up to $200. If a creditor should attach
a printing machine and sell it for $500, he must pay the first $200
to the defendant and apply the balance to the reduction of the
judgment. On the other hand, if the property seized consists of
a number of items and can be divided, the value of each item may
be fixed by an appraiser appointed by the court, and the defendant
may then choose such items as he pleases, not to exceed the amount
of his exemption. The balance may then be sold to apply on the
judgment.
REVIVAL OF JUDGMENTS

It has heretofore been pointed out that a transcript is only
good as a general lien for a period of six years from the date of
judgment, although an execution may be issued at any time within
twenty years from the date of judgment in a court of record. This
raises the practical problem of how to keep a transcript alive after
the judgment is six years old. This can be accomplished by means
of reviving the judgment.
Rule 54 C (h) sets forth the manner in which a judgment may
be revived. A motion should be filed setting forth the date of the
judgment and the amount remaining unsatisfied. The clerk then
issues a notice directed to the defendant to show cause within ten
days why the judgment should not be revived. This notice must be
served upon the defendant in the same manner as a summons.
If the defendant answers, a trial may be held on the issue presented by the answer. If no answer is filed, a revived judgment is
entered after the expiration of the ten day period. A new transcript
should then be obtained and recorded.
The rules provide that if a judgment is revived before the expiration of a lien created by the original judgment, the filing of a
transcript of "entry of revivor" with the clerk and recorded before
the expiration of the lien continues that lien for the same period
from the entry of the revived judgment as is provided for original
judgments. A revived judgment may be again revived in a court of
record but not in the justice court.
The important thing to keep in mind in connection with this
subject is that the revived judgment must be entered within twenty
years after the entry of judgment which it revives, six years in the
justice court.6 In other words, one cannot wait until five days before the expiration of the twenty year period, because a ten day
'COLO.

STAT. ANN., C. 96 § 44 (1)

and 44(2)

(Supp. 1949).
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notice is necessary, and time for service must be allowed. In such
event the judgment of revival could not possibly be entered before
the original judgment expired. Sufficient time must, therefore, be
allowed for this purpose.
STATUS OF JUDGMENT CREDITOR IN COLORADO

One of the important phases of this subject and one upon which
there is a decided difference of opinion, is the question of the status
of the judgment creditor in Colorado. As will be presently indicated, even the decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court on this
subject cannot be reconciled. In the case of Zuckermcn v. Gunther,7 our court made the unqualified statement that, "The law in
this state is to the effect that a judgment creditor is in the same
position as a bona fide purchaser for value."
It appears that Zuckerman had two cars that he desired to
sell. He took them to a used car lot in Denver on Broadway where
there was displayed a sign reading, "Consignment Lot". He left
the cars there to be sold. The sheriff then seized the cars under an
execution which he held against the owner of the car lot, and Zuckerman brought replevin against the sheriff. There had been no
transfer of titles to the used car dealer. The court held that the
execution creditor was entitled to the cars, and Zuckerman, although an innocent party to the transaction, lost his cars. The
opinion further states that the court was "not impressed with the
attempted distinction that the seizure of the cars was not in the
usual course of trade in view of the legal status of the defendant as
a bona fide purchaser for value. Under our law, one connotes the
other. The record presents purely a question of estoppel."
It might be conceded that if a bona fide purchaser for value
bought the cars in the usual course of trade, such purchaser would
have a good title, but here, because of the theory of estoppel and
the legal status of an execution creditor as a bona fide purchaser,
the judgment creditor obtain a better title than the debtor himself,
who had no title at all.
The Supreme Court has never overruled the Zuckerman case
but it has refused to follow it in subsequent decisions. In Wilson v.
Mosko,8 both plaintiff and defendant were used car dealers. Wilson
delivered a car to one Kelly, also a dealer, for the purpose of demonstration and sale. Kelly sold the car to Mosko and obtained payment therefor. Later, on a pretext, Kelly obtained possession of
the car and returned it to Wilson's garage. Mosko learned that the
car was there, retook possession, whereupon Wilson brought a replevin action against Mosko.
Here was a situation in which Wilson had placed the car in the
possession of a dealer for purpose of resale, just as Zuckerman did
1105
Colo. 176, 96 P. 2d 4 (1939).
8110 Colo. 127, 130 P. 2d 927 (1942).
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in leaving his cars at the consignment lot. If an attaching creditor
of Kelly had seized the car while in Kelly's possession under an
execution, then, presumably, the factual situation would be the
same as in the Zuckerman case, and the execution creditor would
have obtained a good title as against the real owner. Mosko was
more than an execution creditor, he was a bona fide purchaser for
value. But the court refused to follow the Zuckerman case and held
in favor of Wilson. The court distinguished that case by saying
that here there was no showing of an actual authority in Kelly to
sell and transfer title to the car. The extent of his authority was
to find a purchaser.
This case was immediately followed by Gunthner v. Union
FinanceCo.9 There the loan company had a floor-plan chattel mortgage on a car owned by the used car dealer. Such a mortgage provides that the car is not to be sold for less than the amount of the
encumbrance and that, upon sale, the proceeds are to be delivered
to the finance company. A judgment creditor of the used car dealer
seized the car under execution. The creditor claimed that it took
the car free from the lien of the chattel mortgage.
The car was a part of the stock in trade, having been on the
used car lot when taken. If a clear title could have been acquired
by a bona fide purchaser for value, under the authority of the
Zuckerman case the attaching creditor would also take it free from
the chattel mortgage. The creditor relied entirely upon the Zuckerman case, but again the court refused to follow its previous decision. The only basis for distinction is pointed out by the court in
this statement: "We think the Zuckerman case has no application
as is indicated by one statement therefrom, viz: the record presents
purely a question of estoppel."
In the opinion of the writer, this purported distinction has no
basis in fact. The legal question involved in the two cases are identical, and the court could have clarified the law if it had come out
openly and said that it had probably made a mistake in the Zuckerman case and that it was expressly overruled.
THE LATEST COLORADO CASE RETURNS TO THE GENERAL RULE

Many lawyers who handle this type of litigation were curious
to know what the court would decide in a case involving a judgment creditor and where the element of estoppel was also present.
Such a case was recently decided in Susman v. Exchange National
Bank.10 In that case the plaintiff had a judgment against one Taylor for about $2,000. Learning that he had a checking account in
a certain bank, plaintiff obtained execution and garnisheed the
bank. The bank answered that it had $728 on deposit in a checking
account in the name of the defendant. Thereupon a third party
110 Colo. 449, 135 P. 2d 237 (1943).
10117 Colo. 12, 183 P. 2d 571 (1947).
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filed a petition in intervention, claiming that the money belonged
to him.
The intervenor alleged that he had given Taylor $750 for the
purpose of buying some cows; that Taylor had deposited his money
to his account in his own name; and that before he had a chance to
buy the cows, the garnishment impounded the funds. At the trial,
it was established that there had been a deposit of $750 about the
time of the transaction with the intervenor, but it also appeared
that Taylor had paid amounts to a grocery store, a department
store, and a music teacher by check drawn on this account and had
thus actually used some of the $750 for these purposes.
It thus appeared that the intervenor had given the judgment
debtor ostensible ownership of the fund, and the element of estoppel
was present and was pleaded. If Taylor had bought his wife a new
dress and paid for it by check drawn on this account, could it be
successively urged that the intervenor could follow the fund and
reclaim it from the merchant? The judgment debtor had full control of the account, and there was nothing to indicate that there
had been a special deposit or that the money constituted a trust
fund. Keeping in mind the status of a judgment creditor under the
Zuckerman case, the plaintiff was in the same position as a bona
fide purchaser for value. He was in the same position as the grocer
and the department store who had accepted Taylor's checks in return for merchandise.
The court held for the intervenor saying:
The garnishing creditor can reach funds of the depositor only
in cases where the depositor is the true owner thereof . . . The
creditor of a bank depositor who garnishes the money in the bank
to the credit of his debtor is in no better position than the depositor.
Consequently, funds cannot be attached or garnished in an action
against the depositor where they have been deposited in trust or
belonging to another. We regard Zuckerman v. Guther as distinguishable.

Under this latest decision, it would appear that the court has
completely reversed itself, and instead of holding that a judgment
creditor could obtain a better title than the defendant himself had,
it now follows the doctrine that a judgment creditor acquires no
better title than is held by the defendant. If this principal had
been applied to the Zuckerman case, the results would have been
different. This view is consistent
with the general rule 11 and with
the earlier Colorado decisions. 12
But the Zuckerman case still stands on the books of this state
as the law on this subject, though not always followed. Who knows
under what circumstances the court may decide to follow it again?
It should either be expressly overruled or declared to be the law of
this state so that the uncertainty which now exists on this subject
would be removed.
11 23 C. J. 745 et seq.
12Ohio Co. v. Barr, 58 Colo. 116, 144 P. 522 (1914) ; Copeland v. Bank, 13 Colo.
App. 489, 59 P. 70 (1899) ; Irwin v. Beggs, 24 Colo. App. 158, 132 P. 385 (1913); Hartstock v. Wright, 16 Colo. App. 48, 64 P. 245 (1901).

